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A Guide to Capital Outlays in the
Current Reeovery
UGH concern has been expressed of late about
the atypically sluggish rebound in real fixed invest-
ment expenditures in the current recovery.’ Such con-
cern reflects the important role of fixed investment
in a dynamic economy — it not only serves to aug-
ment the current pace of economic activity, but also
influences the sustainability of the economy’s upward
momentum beyond “recovery.”
To understand the sluggish rebound in capital out-
lays to date and to assess the likely course of such
outlays, it is useful to examine the atypically severe
decline in capital outlays that preceded the current
recovery. A theory of the investment process provides
a useful frame of reference in understanding the
past evolution of fixed investment outlays and in
assessing their prospective course.
The investment process is fundamentally a process
of adjusting the thin’s existing capital stock to some
desired level. The desired capital stock is ultimately
determined by expected net return, which is influ-
enced by such factors as sales expectations, the ac-
quisition cost of new capital, the expected cost of
employing capital, and business tax considerations.
Reflecting downward revisions in expectations of net
return (as reflected in capital commitments data),
capital outlays plummeted in the most recent reces-
sion.2 Two factors most responsible for the decline in
expected net return appear to be (1) a declinein sales
expectations and (2) a rise in the acquisition cost
of new capital goods. Both factors are influenced, in
turn, by the sudden and unexpectedly sharp increase
in the relative price of energy and the cumulative ef-
fects of increasingly exacting government regulations.
The anemic rebound in capital outlays in the cur-
rent recovery can be attributed to the less than robust
‘See The Business Situation,” Survey of Current Business
(October 1976), p. 8. Unless otherwise noted, all references
to expenditures are in real terms.
‘The capital commitments data analyzed in the paper are to be
found in Series no. 20, “Contracts and Orders for plant and
equipment billions of 1972 dollars,” U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Business Conditions Digest (Jamiary 1977)~ This
series is considered a leading indicator of both general eco-
nomic activity and the actual flow of fixed investment
expenditures
upward revisions in the expected net return on invest-
ment, as reflected in investment commitments data.
The severity of the preceding recession is partially
responsible since it left the balance sheets of many
firms in a vulnerable position, as witnessed by the
dramatic increase in the incidence of business failures.
An additional factor responsible for the sluggish re-
bound in actual capital outlays has been the system-
atic shortfalls in capital outlays relative to intended
outlays. Such shortfalls appear to be the result of
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The process of rebuilding balance sheet positions
appears to have been completed. The rate of increase
in the acquisition cost of new capital goods relative
to the price of output in general has slowed. In addi-
tion, there has been a sustained increase in the utili-
zation rate of both human resources (as measured by
the ratio of the number of individuals employed to
the population of working age) and capital resources
throughout the recovery to date. In view of both these
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developments and the likely “catch-up” of deferred
outlays, a sustained but modest upward revision in
the desired capital stock relative to the actual stock is
expected. Such an upward revision will be reflected in
increased investment commitments before it is trans-
lated into an increased flow of actual capital
expenditures.
THE INVESTMENT PROCESS
The Decision to Increase Capital Stock
Capital formation, or investment, entails a sacrifice
of present consumption opportunities in return for an
expected increase in such opportunities in the future.
Since the present is relatively certain whereas the
future is not, capital formation involves certain sacri-
fice currently for uncertain returns in the future.3
Therefore, investment decisions are influenced by
attitudes toward risk, changes in perception of risks
associated with the outcome of investment decisions
and, most fundamentally, by expectations of net
return.
The expected net return on investment is influ-
enced, in turn, by a complex of such factors as (1)
sales expectations, (2) the expected tax treatment of
business income, depreciation, and equipment pur-
chases, (3) the acquisition cost of new capital goods,
and (4) the expected cos-t of conforming to environ-
mental and safety regulations. These factors jointly
influence the expected value of output relative to the
cost of using capital to produce that output and,
hence, the investment decision. Attempts to represent
the unobserved expected variables by observed proxy
variables are still at an exploratory stage. Some ex-
amples of proxy variables that have been tried are
final sales and changes in them, corporate cash flows,
capacity utilization rate, value of the firm, corporate
bond rate, the ratio of profits to fixed assets, and the
tax structure. The estimated link between these vari-
ables and investment expenditures continues to be
the subject of much controversy. There are as many
theories of investment as there are different judg-
ments as to the best empirical proxies for the deter-
minants of the expected net return on investment
and, thereby, of the desired capital stock.4
3
For a modem restatement and extension of this basic Fish-
erian view of investment, see Jack Hirshleifer, investment,
Interest, and Capital (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
For the original treatise, see Irving Fisher, The Theory of In-
terest (New York: Kelley and Millman, Inc., 1954).
4
For a survey of such theories, ranging all the way from the
naive accelerator to a sophisticated neoclassical theory, see
Dale W. Jorgenson, “Econometric Studies of Investment Be-
havior: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature (December
1971). especially pp. 1128-29.
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The Timing of Investment
General agreement exists, however, that investment
at the individual firm level is usefully viewed as an
attempt to adjust the firm’s existing capital stock to
some desired level. Such adjustment takes place over
time, both for technological and economic reasons,
and therefore, the investment process at the firm level
can be viewed as a multi-stage decision process.5
First, a decision is made as to whether the actual
capital stock differs from the desired capital stock.
Next, through such processes as budgeting, appropria-
tions, and actual placing of orders and contracts, the
timing of investment expenditures to achieve the de-
sired stock is determined. The actual flow of invest-
ment outlays is the final stage in the process and
represents the realization of intended investment out-
lays.6 The process is also ongoing in that a continuous
reassessment of both the previously determined level
of desired capital stock and the timing of investment
outlays takes place.
The decision as to the size of the desired capital
stock, which is made in the first st-age of the process,
is revealed by movements of the data on capital in-
vestment commitments.7 Capital investment commit-
ments have been found to be a useful indicator of
future movements in investment outlays.8
The linkage between the commitments and the
subsequent investment expenditures is not water-
tight, however, and three factors appear to account
for the slippage: first, outright cancellations of orders
and contracts; second, deferral of orders; and third,
supply constraints in the capital goods sector which
delay the delivery of orders and construction of plants
on time.
~The paper by Jorgenson cited above also surveys various
empirical attempts to represent the tilne structure of the in-
vestment process by various distributed lag functions (such
as the geometric and rational). See Jorgenson, “Econometric
Studies,’ pp. 1134-38.
6
For a discussion of the various stages of the investment
process, see Victor Zarnowitz, Orders, Production, and Invest-
ment — A Cyclical and Structural Analysis (New York: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1973), especially Chap-
ter 9. For an analysis of realization of intended investment
outlays, see Robert Eisner, “Realization of Investment Antici-
pations,” The Brookings Quarterly Model of the United States,
ed. James S. Duesenberry, Gary Fromm, Lawrence B. Klein
and Edwin Kuh (Amsterdam: North-I-Inlland, 1965), pp.
95-128.
~A variable such as capital investment commitments is known
as a symptomatic variable for investment expenditure, as
opposed to such causal variables ‘as final sales, corporate
profits after taxes, corporate cash flow, capacity utilization
rate and the price of capital services (which often are used
as proxies for the expected return).
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The first factor, cancellation, reflects a reassessment
of decisions reached at the first stage of the invest-
ment process — that is, an adjustment downward in
the level of the desired stock of capital. Such a reas-
sessment would be triggered by a deterioration in the
perceived profitability of investment and would be
reflected in a decrease in outstanding investment
commitments. However, the second factor, deferral,
reflects changes in the timing of investment rather
than any substantial revisions in the desired stock of
capital. Any firmly-held expectation of imminent
changes in government policy, such as an increase in
the investment tax credit, for example, will affect the
deferral decision. The third factor, based on supply
constraints, is qualitatively different from the first two
in that the shortfall in actual investment outlays rela-
tive to commitments is likely to reflect an excess
rather than a deficient aggregate investment demand.
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
DURING THE DOWNTURN
The decline in real plant and equipment investment
in the most recent recession has been the severest of
all the postwar cycles in terms of both magnitude and
duration.°The steep decline in plant and equipment
spending was signalled by a steep decline in capital
investment commitments, as shown in Chart II. The
commitments data indicate the extent of deteriora-
tion in business expectations about the profitability of
investments during the most recent recession. The
downturn in investment spending, measured at con-
stant prices, in the 1973-75 recession was as severe, for
example, as in the 1957-58 downturn. llowever, in-
vestment commitments fell much more sharply in the
most recent downturn, indicating a sharp deteriora-
tion in the prospective return on investments that had
not characterized prior penods of economic recession.
The Impact of Exogenous Shocks
The sharp decline in the commitments data sug-
gests that the discrepancy between the desired and
the actual stock of capital fell sharply in the recent
recession. This fall in the desired relative to the actual
capital stock is traceable to adjustments made by both
9The nonrcsidential fixed investment (NRFI) consponent of
GNP is composed of the producers’ durable equipment and
“consti-ssction other than residential nonfarru” components of
the national income accounts. Business fixed investnients
BFI ) is arrived at by excluding from NRFI farm equip-
ment and construction, construction In’ private nonprofit
institutions, capital outlays charged to current expenses and
capital outlays of independent professionals. The movements
in the two series NFRI & BFI I are statistically indistin-
gmshablc, however.
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the producers and potential buyers of newly produced
capital goods to external shocks, suds as the quad-
rupling in oil prices and increasingly stringent regula-
tory mandates. Both factors have caused a drastic and
largely unexpected increase in the cost of using many
existing productive facilities and technology. Such an
increase in cost reduces the observed utilization rate
of the existing capital stock and, holding other factors
constant, increases the demand for new capital goods
that embody more energy-efficient and regulation-
conforming technologies. The observed utilization rate
of productive capacity’ would have a downward bias
to the extent that it does not fully reflect the accel-
erated economic obsolescence of the existing capital
stock.10
If the economy in general, aisd the buyers and pro-
ducers of capital goods in particular, had made ad-
justments to these shocks instantaneously and without
cost, there would not have been any decrease in the
utilization of labor and capital resources.~ There
would simply have been a shrinkage in the size of
capacity output. However, such costless and instan-
taneous adjustments are not possflle in the wos’ld we
10
F’or an analysis which presents significant indirect evidence
corroborating the view that there is such a downward bias,
sec Dcnis S. Kaniosky, “The Link Between Mossey and Prices
—1971-1976,” this Rcciew (June 1976), ~‘p. 17-23.
T
’fhe adjustment ‘vas complicated by the world—wide reper-
cussions of the energy-price rise and other fortuitous factors.
For a detailed analysis of the various causes of the most
recent recession, see Norman N. Bowsher, “Two Stages to
the Current Recession,” this Rcvicw (June 1975), pp. 2—S.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
live in, which is characterized by: (1) imperfect infor-
mation regarding market and productive opportuni-
ties, (2) resistence to and constraints on downward
adjustments in real wages which would have been
necessary to conform to the reduction in the capital-
labor ratio and the size of the total output, and (3)
less than perfectly malleable capital.
In such a world, a sudden and unexpected accelera-
tion in the obsolescence of existing capital stock in-
duces an increase in the unemployment of labor
during the adjustment period.’2 The increase in un-
employment tends to generate, in turn, a decline in
income and employment prospects of both the em-
ployed and the newly unemployed workers. Precau-
tionary belt-tightening ensues, as reflected in deterio-
ration in the index of consumer sentiment and a
decline in the volume of retail sales. This in turn
causes business to become skeptical about sales pros-
pects and tends, for a time at least, to dampen
demand for new capital. The desire to replace obso-
lete capital tends to be dominated by overall pessi-
mism about the profitability of even the new capital.
A further adverse feedback effect on the capacity
utilization rate and the desired stock of capital
ensues.
The steep decline in the composite index of sensi-
tive financial flows during the recent downturn is
indicative of such a deterioration in near-term income
and employment prospects. This induces nonbusiness
economic units to tighten belts and attempt to
strengthen their balance sheet positions to cope with
the “foreseeable” contingencies (Chart III).’~Such a
retrenchment by nonbusiness economic units would
adversely affect near-term business expectations of
net return on investment.
Impact of Capital Goods Prices
The behavior of the price and quantity of newly
produced capital goods during the recent downswing
suggests that the rise in the supply price of new
capital goods also had a depressing effect on the
125i,ch an increase in unemploy,uerut is triggered by the de’
dine in the demand for labor induced by a medsiction in the
effective capital stock consequent to the accelerated obsoles-
cence of existing capital stock. If capital were perfectly
o,alleable, capital could not become obsolete.
‘
3
The Department of Commerce recently revised some of its
data series published in the Business- Conditions Digest. The
Composite Index of Sensitive Financial Flows was renamed
the Composite Index of Money and Financial Flows and its
components changed. Previously composed of changes in
consumer installment debt, business loans, mortgage debt
and money supply ( M 1) in current dollars, it currently is
made up of changes in total liquid assets (M7), Ml in 1972




desired stock of capital. Two factors impinging on
the producers of new capital goods — (1) the cost of
adopting and embodying more energy-efficient tech-
nologies and (2) the cost of conforming to the myriad
regulatory mandates — added substantially to the
cost of producing capital goods, thereby reducing the
supply of new capital goods.14
The price of new capital goods escalated at a sub-
stantially faster rate than that of goods in general
throughout the whole period of recession (Chart IV).
Such an occurrence is unprecedented in the postwar
period and tends to dampen the quantity of addi-
tional capital demanded, The fundamental reason for
this, of course, is that higher and rising prices of new
capital goods, when not matched by optimistic ex-
pectations of higher and rising future net revenue
streams from these goods, reduce the expected net
return on investment.
An alternative way to characterize the “ultimate”
determinant of the desired capital stock and the en-
tailed investment spending is in terms of the dis-
crepancy between the price of existing capital goods
and the cost of reproducing them.15 We do not as yet
14For a docusnentation of the increase in the cost of con-
fonuing to regulatory constraints, see Murray L. Weiden-
baum, Government-Mandated Price Increases; A Neglected
Aspect of Inflation (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
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have a reliable index of the price of existing capital
goods. However, there is likely to be a significant
positive relationship between the movement in the
(unobserved) price of capital goods and (observed)
equity prices. The reasons are: the price of existing
capital goods represents the present value of the ex-
pected net earning stream derived from them, and at
the same time the value of ownership claims on cor-
porations derives in part from the present value of the
expected net earning stream of capital goods owned
by the corporation. In view of the sharp decline in
equity prices during the 1973-75 downturn, it is rea-
sonable to infer that a price index of existing capital
goods would have fallen, ~r at least, not have risen. In
contrast, the cost of producing new capital goods has
risen sharply, thereby making the acquisition of such
goods less attractive in general. In addition, should
such a unique experience regarding the price of capi-
tal goods increase uncertainty as to its future course,
it would effectively foreshorten the time horizon for
investment decisions. This would tend to reduce the
desired capital stock by narrowing the menu of profit-
able investment opportunities.
INVESTMENT DURING RECOVERY
The improvement in business expectations (as re-
flected in the commitments data) regarding the net
return on investments since the recession trough in
March 1975 has been modest relative to the other
recoveries (see Chart II). Six quarters into the re-
covery, commitments in real terms were more than 30
percent below the level attained at the previous ref-
erence peak. In the previous recoveries, however, the
_____ commitment levels attained at previous reference
peaks were topped within two or three quarters,
- except for the 1970 episode when the full rebound to
l947~l1~ the previous peak was made in the sixth quarter of
recovery.
The most important factor adversely impinging on
business investment commitments in the current re-
covery has been the widespread concern shared by
many businessmen for solvency and the state of bal-
ance sheets. That such a concern was well founded
was underscored by the widespread, lingering inci-
dence of business failures well into the current re-
covery. Business failures, as measured by the aggregate
monthly amount of the current liabilities of failed
businesses, reached a climactic high of $1,295 million
in October 1975, two quarters into the recovery?6
Such widespread business failures reflect a generally
weakened balance sheet position of business firms,
due variously to the recession-induced decline in
profits and the inflation-induced increase in real tax
liabilities.
For example, in an inflationary environment, the
use of first-in first-out inventory accounting methodis
and the basing of depreciation charges on historical
cost, overstate the extent of profits, thereby increasing
the real tax liabilities. To compound the difficulties,
many businesses were burdened with a debt-heavy
capital structure, itself a legacy of favorable tax treat-
ment of debt relative to equity capital.
The goal of solvency became a target of immediate
concern in many business firms and the entailed
strategy of repairing their balance sheet positions was
adopted by many business firms. The debt structure
was lengthened. Cash flows and the equity market
were used to build up ownership claims and reduce
indebtedness. In the process, the expansion strategy
based on increased net investment outlays was tem-
porarily deferred and the rebound in investment out-
lays lagged.17 Business cash flows were used to aug-
ment balance sheet positions rather than to increase
spending on capital goods.18 The sustained improve-
ment in the profitability index since 1975 has not yet
T6
For perspective, the highest postwar figure prior to the most
recent recession was $253 million in August 1972.
‘TFor an analysis of different types of grand business
strategies, see William F. Glueek, Business Policy Strategy
Formation and Management Action, 2nd ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 120-47.
58For a recent account of balance sheet rebsilding, see ‘Firms
Spend Carefully, Pay Off Much Debt and Build Liquidity,”
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been mirrored either in the commitments data or in
real investment outlays.~°
Outlook
Recovery in the investment commitments data has
been sluggish and so has the recovery in investment
outlays in the current recovery to date. The slow
recovery in the commitments data reflects the lag in
revising upward the desired capital stock relative to
the actual. But what of the outlook? Any upward
revision in the desired capital stock probably would
be reflected in the commitments data prior to the
actual increase in the flow of investment outlays.
Available data on business balance sheets, profitability,
money and financial flows, and the behavior of the
relative price of capital goods indicate that a sus-
tained but modest improvement in investment com-
mitments and outlays is in store.
An additional factor which bears on this likely
course of investment outlays is the observed relation-
ship between actual investment outlays and the par-
ticular kind of investment anticipations data called
“first anticipations” of capital outlays published by the
Commerce Department.2° The “first anticipations”
series refers to the capital outlays business firms are
planning to expend in the quarter immediately follow-
ing the quarter in which the survey is taken. As such,
it is even more closely correlated with the actual in-
vestment outlays than the commitments data. The
reason is that the data reflect forecasts concerning how
the outlays (which have been determined in the
previous stages in the investment process concerning
appropriations and placing of orders and contracts)
would be allocated between the next quarter and
beyond. The discrepancy between the actual and an-
ticipated outlays reflects the same set of forces as that
responsible for the aforementioned discrepancy be-




The index is composed of adiusted corporate profits in 1972
dollars, the ratio of price to noit labor cost in manufacturing,
and the stock price index. See Business conditions Digest
(November 1976), pp. 8 and 59. For a more detailed
description of the behavior of aggregate business (corporate)
balance sheet since 1960, see Timothy Q. Cook, “Net Cor-
porate Saving in the 1970s,” Economic Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond (May/june 1976), pp. 3-13.
20
For a discussion of the anticipations data and its relation to
the commitments data, see Zarnowitz, Orders, Production, and
Investment, pp. 433-42; also Arthur M. Okun, “The Value
of Anticipations Data in Forecasting National Product,” The
Quality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data: A
conference of the Universities — National Bureau Committee
for Economic Research, National Bureau of Economic Re-




First Anticipations of Business Investment
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Chart V plots anticipated expenditures as a percent
of actual expenditures. One-hundred percent indi-
cates a perfect coincidence between the anticipated
and the actual. Anything above 100 percent indicates
a shortfall in actual relative to planned expenditures
and vice versa. The chart shows that, in the current
recovery, actual expenditures are yet to exceed the
planned levels six quarters into the recovery.
Such a development is also unique in the postwar
episodes. It appears to reflect the changes in the tim-
ing decisions (the deferral) of planned outlays rather
than any substantial reassessment of prior decisions
regarding the desired stock of capital. Such an inter-
pretation appears reasonable, in view of 1) the be-
havior of the commitments data, 2) the fact that first
anticipations data have steadily increased since the
second quarter after the trough, and 3) the more than
usual dose of uncertainty regarding the thrust of
national economic policy. As the uncertainty regard-
ing the economicpolicy environment (which was asso-
ciated first with the presidential election and then
with the thrust of the policy of the new Administra-
tion) recedes, the expected “catch-up” with this source
of deferred outlays is likely to add strength to the re-
covery in investment outlays.
In sum, the near-term outlook for a gradual and
modest rebound in business capital spending is favor-
able. However, it does not appear that capital spend-
ing will top the previous peak within the next two or
three quarters, unless there is an unexpected shift in
business expectations of net return on investment.
Such a shift, should it occur, would be signaled first
by a substantial rise in commitments — as yet, com-
mitments have not emitted such signals.
Percent
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